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Abstract
  
The article aims to empirically validate three questions. Have productivity differences in 
European manufacturing been increasing or diminishing and what has been the situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe countries? Are productivity differences homogenous over time 
and across manufacturing industries? What is the role of the internal structure of 
manufacturing for convergence? For this purpose, an analysis of σ- and β-convergence in 11 
manufacturing industries has been conducted, making use of shift-share decomposition 
techniques. A complex view of catching-up is demonstrated with heterogeneity over time 
and across industries. Convergence occurred in Western Europe until approximately 1990, 
but since then disparities have been increasing and CEE countries were the only ones 
catching up. Convergence took place predominantly in medium-tech industries, while both 
low-tech and high-tech industries experienced divergence. Structural differences account 
for a minor share of the productivity disparities; however, changes in employment structures 
and productivity together led to the formation of two clubs of countries: low-tech, low 
productivity and high-tech, high productivity countries.
JEL classification codes: L16, L6, O47
Keywords: productivity convergence, structural change, manufacturing, economic growth
1 Article was prepared within the research project “Convergence in countries and regions of the European Union” 
funded by the Polish National Science Centre, on the basis of the decision No. DEC-2011/01/N/HS4/03077.
Productivity Convergence in Manufacturing in the 
European Union: The Role of Economic Structure
6GRODZICKI
REB 2013 
Vol. 5, No. 2
1. Introduction
The article contributes to inquiries into the sources and nature of economic convergence by 
looking at the processes of productivity growth and structural change in European 
manufacturing. Analyses of productivity differences among the economies of the European 
Union seem to be of high relevance, especially from the point of view of the consequences of 
European integration. In the research, we concentrate on manufacturing for a couple of 
reasons. Firstly, results presented by several papers stand in contradiction to theoretical 
predictions on productivity convergence. Economic theory predicts that international trade 
could be an important convergence channel, facilitating technology spillovers and enhancing 
competition (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Ben-David, 1996). Hence, manufacturing 
should be exhibiting faster convergence than other sectors, especially in the economically 
integrated European Union. However, Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b) opened the debate 
on productivity growth in manufacturing by demonstrating that in this particular sector no 
convergence had taken place among the developed countries2. Looking for reasons for such 
situation was a predominant purpose for our interest in the topic. 
 Secondly, despite an on-going deindustrialisation, manufacturing remains a crucial 
sector for long-term development, as it provides consumption and investment goods and is 
the source of technological change. In the context of the recent re-industrialisation debate3, 
research like this seems to be of a special value (Szirmai, 2011; Naude and Szirmai, 2012). In 
the article, we put emphasis on the relations between productivity growth and economic 
structure, which is understood, following S. Kuznets (1949, s. 205), as “the relative 
distribution of its [economy’s] resources and total output among the several industries”.
 We aim to answer three interrelated questions. Firstly, can we confirm Bernard and 
Jones’ results in the sample of old European Union countries; that is, in the most economically 
integrated region of the world and do these results apply also to its new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? Secondly, are productivity inequalities homogenous 
over time and across manufacturing industries? And thirdly, what is the role of the internal 
structure of the manufacturing sector for productivity developments in European countries? 
Namely, to what extent can productivity differences and their changes be attributed to 
different composition of employment between manufacturing industries?
 For this purpose, an analysis of σ- and β-convergence in 11 2-digit manufacturing 
industries will be conducted. Shift-share decomposition techniques will be used in order to 
distinguish growth and structure effects. The application of these techniques with a thorough 
discussion of the results constitutes a main part of the value of the article. The analysis will 
be based on data from the GGDC Productivity Level Database and the EU-KLEMS Database 
and will cover 14 old (for the period 1970-2006) and 8 new members (1995-2006) of the 
European Union. Making use of those new, precise databases is a second major originality 
introduced by the article to the literature.
 The article is organised as follows: section 2 provides a brief description of the state of the 
art and a presentation of the theoretical underpinnings of the analysis. It also shows how the 
article contributes to the debate. Then, in section 3, methods of the research are outlined, with 
2 Hereafter, ‘sector’ will refer to large units e.g. Agriculture, Manufacturing, Services; and ‘industry’ to smaller 
units, within sectors, e.g. ‘Food, Beverages and Tobacco’.
3 See, for instance, recent documents of the European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/
mission-growth/ (access 25.05.2013).
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a special emphasis on convergence decomposition techniques. Section 4 presents the results of 
the analysis – firstly in terms of σ-convergence and next in terms of β-convergence. Section 5 
provides a discussion of the results, concludes and indicates directions for further research.
2. Literature Review and Importance of the Article
2.1. Convergence and Economic Structure and in Economic Literature
The hypothesis of convergence – of lagging economies catching-up and reducing development 
or productivity disparities – has its origins in the writings of Gerschenkron (1962) and 
Abramovitz (1986), but it was formalised mainly in neoclassical theory and its models of 
economic growth (Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991). Exogenous, Solow-type models of economic 
growth predicted the occurrence of conditional convergence. This means that when 
controlling for structural parameters (like investment rates, demography) the rate of growth 
of the productivity of an economy in a period should be negatively related to its initial level. 
Mechanisms that stand behind the convergence, according to those models, are universal 
access to technology and knowledge and diminishing marginal returns to capital. As stated 
more generally by Abramovitz (1986, p. 386), “the [catch-up] hypothesis asserts that being 
backward in level of productivity carries a potential for rapid advance”.
 The two most popular concepts of convergence are empirical in nature. The β-convergence 
and σ-convergence hypotheses, proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), although 
theoretically controversial (see e.g. Temple 1999), serve as a useful benchmark for all 
empirical analyses of international economic inequalities. Those two concepts will be 
investigated in our research.
 The β-convergence hypothesis (in its absolute version) states that the rate of economic 
growth is negatively correlated with the initial level of development of an economy. It can 
also be expressed that a growth rate of an economy is positively correlated with its distance 
from the economy that leads in terms of productivity. This can be tested in a regression of 
the following form:
ϑi,t = α + β(ln γM,t-1 – ln γi,t-1) + μt + εi,t ,                                                                                 (1)
where: ϑi,t– rate of economic growth between period t-1 and t; ln γi,t-1 – logarithm of lagged 
productivity in the economy i; ln γM,t-1– logarithm of lagged productivity in the leading 
economy in a sample;  α – constant term;  β – convergence parameter; and μt  and εi,t represent 
a period dummy and a random error term, respectively. Positive β indicates that convergence 
is taking place, while negative β suggests the divergence of economies.
 The σ-convergence hypothesis refers to changes in inequalities between countries, 
measured by a chosen statistical dispersion index, typically the coefficient of variation. 
When its value diminishes in time, then σ-convergence is taking place in the sample.
 Most of the mainstream theory and empirics in the field of economic growth and 
convergence, abstracting from structural issues, treat the economy as a homogenous unity 
represented by a production function of some sort. From this point of view, economic 
growth consists of a quantitative extension of the productive capabilities of the economy due 
to factor accumulation or the enhancement of productivity. On the other hand, there is a 
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significant amount of research on the role of the economic structure of development, ranging 
from Schumpeter (1911), neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary accounts (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Fagerberg, 2000; Verspagen, 2001) to the sectoral analysis of such authors as 
Kuznets (1980) and Chenery (1986). An extended review of structural change literature is 
provided by Silva and Teixeira (2008).
 What prevails in the latter approach is the understanding that economic growth (traditionally 
understood in quantitative terms) and economic development (as a broader, qualitative concept) 
are actually indistinguishable. In a longer time horizon growth takes place thanks to a constant 
structural change and shifts in economic activity from traditional to modern sectors 
(Schumpeter, 1911). Those movements are caused by changes in demand composition and in 
widely defined economic potential, which consists particularly of access to qualified labour 
force, sufficient capital formation and the technology of production (Kuznetz, 1980). 
 However, even when those three elements are available, the structural change is in no 
way automatic and it requires a certain level of social capabilities in several areas (Abramovitz, 
1986). Particular industries are heterogeneous in reference to their knowledge base, 
technologies in use, types of inputs or demand patterns. The concept of sectoral systems of 
innovations, presented by Malerba (2002), underlines the learning aspect of development 
and the fact that moving economic activity from one sector to another requires certain 
adjustments in social and organisational routines at the level of both single enterprise and 
whole society. The institutional surroundings, which organises the functioning of a specific 
sector, but also that of a horizontal importance (like education system, labour market, 
financial markets), needs to adapt to the requirements of the changing composition of the 
economy (Soete and Verspagen, 1993). Governments can significantly enhance those 
adaptations by influencing factor endowments. Lin (2010) argues that by providing specific 
types of hard and soft infrastructure, governments affect incentives for entrepreneurs and, 
consequently, the direction of structural change.
 What is more, ex ante assessment of structural change can differ from its ex post results. 
Certain movements, optimal from a static point of view, can be detrimental for growth in its 
dynamic aspect. Because optimal economic structure is only a relative concept, changing 
with development level (Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2011), the economy needs to adapt its 
patterns of specialisation in order to sustain its growth.
 The presented heterogeneity of types of economic activity implies that structural change 
may function as an important convergence factor. In particular, it might accelerate growth 
in catching-up economies relative to the leaders (Abramovitz, 1986). Analytically, we can 
distinguish the following reasons for why structural transformation can be beneficial for 
aggregate productivity growth:
•	 labour	might	shift	towards	high	productivity	industries;
•	 labour	 might	 shift	 towards	 industries	 which	 are	 characterised	 by	 high	 productivity	
dynamics, which can partly result from their higher catching-up potential;
•	 the	increasing	economic	role	of	some	industries	might	generate	positive	spill	overs	to	the	
rest of the economy.
2.2. Convergence in Manufacturing
The contemporary debate about convergence in manufacturing industries finds its milestone 
in the papers of Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b), which are probably the most important 
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examples of the application of the economic convergence concept at the sectoral level of 
analysis. Their major outcome was that the occurrence and pace of convergence was 
diversified between economic sectors – while agriculture, mining and services experienced 
an equalisation of productivities between countries, no such phenomenon took place in 
manufacturing. This result inspired many other authors to try to verify this using different 
samples and employing different research techniques.
 Those of them that have investigated the performance of developed countries in recent 
decades present results mostly in line with Bernard and Jones (e.g. Carree et al., 2000; 
Pascual and Westerman, 2000; Freeman and Yerger, 2001; Inklaar and Timmer, 2009). The 
convergence of productivity occurred only in some manufacturing industries and was faster 
in those less advanced technologically (Carree et al., 2000). Hultberg et al. (2004) find that 
conditional convergence, when controlled for investment rates and with country fixed-
effects, was taking place in OECD countries through 1973–1990, which means that 
technological catching-up was possible. Similar results for developed countries through 
1963–1982 are presented by Dollar and Wolff (1988).
 Other studies, however, detect convergence – but only in large, more heterogeneous 
samples of countries (Rodrik, 2013) or during much longer periods (Madsen and Timol, 
2010). Rodrik (2013) shows that in a global sample, manufacturing is in fact one of the 
sectors with significant convergence. Similar results are presented by Castellacci et al. (2008), 
with the reservation that processes of convergence are very heterogeneous and that there are 
significant nonlinearities in their pace.
 Another set of studies considers the role of structural change and the sectoral composition 
of the economy for overall productivity growth and its convergence. A variety of shift-share 
decomposition techniques was developed in order to distinguish it statistically. At the level 
of the whole economy, the significance of the economic structure for development is well 
established (Chenery, 1986; Syrguin, 1986; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Successful catching-
up in its early phase consists in industrialisation, while it becomes much more difficult close 
to the efficiency frontier, and then requires moving labour from low- to high-productivity 
industries (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Two hypotheses that are commonly tested in those 
analyses are those of “a structural bonus” and “a structural burden”. The former states that 
with development labour concentrates in industries with higher productivity, and therefore, 
structural change contributes positively to growth. However, at the same time, labour might 
move to less dynamic industries and in this way constitute a burden for further growth 
(Fagerberg, 2000; Peneder, 2003). Shift-share decompositions devoted specifically to the 
manufacturing sector led to ambiguous implications about the role of its internal structure 
for development. The ‘within effect’, which represents average growth within industries, 
dominates the total productivity growth, while shifts in employment contribute to growth 
either positively or negatively, depending on the sample (Fagerberg, 2000; Timmer and 
Szirmai, 2000; Peneder, 2003). 
 Finally, some analyses aim to capture the role of economic structure for productivity 
differences between economies at a particular moment in time. They show that different 
employment compositions in European economies account for a small share of the development 
disparities (regional level: Esteban, 1999; Papalia and Bertarelli, 2009). Productivity disparities 
are to a large extent homogenous across industries – lagging economies have a productivity 
gap in most of them. Different specialisation patterns are not that important for productivity 
differences. However, the aforementioned studies took into consideration the whole economy. 
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When we focus solely on the manufacturing sector we should expect that the role of 
employment structure is even smaller, due to a more similar level of productivities among 
particular industries.
 To our knowledge, little analysis of manufacturing industries, which included CEE 
countries, has been undertaken so far. Studies conducted for the whole economy demonstrate 
that CEE countries after 1995 achieved higher growth rates than old EU members. However, 
structural change only contributed to convergence of labour productivity (Parteka, 2009) or 
total factor productivity (Bah and Brada, 2009) to a limited extent. 
 In his comprehensive analysis of the convergence potential of six CEE countries, Stephan 
(2003) showed that manufacturing accounted for a large share of the total productivity gap 
between them and the then-European Union. He managed to identify some early specialisation 
patterns in manufacturing production that might have influenced future growth: Slovakia was 
in the best situation in the sample, whereas Poland and Estonia had employment structures 
that could have been detrimental to growth. Similar conclusions about evolving differences 
among the new member countries in the pre-accession period were drawn by Landesman 
(2003). Later work by Havlik et al. (2008) presents a picture of a very dynamic catching-up of 
transition economies. It is shown that CEE countries experience fast structural transformation 
and productivity growth, especially in the manufacturing sector. 
2.3. Value of the Article
This article adds value for the presented literature in a number of areas. Firstly, following 
Inklaar and Timmer (2009) and making use of the GGDC Productivity and EU-KLEMS 
databases, we analyse convergence with industry-specific Purchaser Power Parities indices 
(given for the benchmark year 1997), which enables us to conduct a methodologically proper 
analysis for the European Union on the basis of yearly data up to 2007. Secondly, we employ 
a complex approach to the convergence problem – taking into consideration and decomposing 
both σ- and β-convergence. We test different versions of the productivity convergence 
hypothesis, allowing for time and industry heterogeneity. Thirdly, we also analyse trends in 
productivity differences for the new member states recognising the specificity of the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
3. Research Methods
3.1. Measuring Productivity
In the analysis we make use of two traditional concepts, namely the σ- and β-convergence 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990). For each of them we conduct a specific shift-share 
decomposition of total convergence into three elements, relating to: productivity within 
particular industries, structure of employment and the product of these two. Those statistical 
exercises can lead to important, descriptive results about sources of productivity differences 
and about the role of economic structure for growth and convergence.
 However, it should be remembered that strict distinguishing into structural change and 
productivity growth makes sense only statistically, as these two processes are two, 
interrelated aspects of the same development. In reality, it is structural change and moves to 
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more technologically advanced industries that sustain economic growth and vice versa – it 
is the economic growth, with its changes for both demand composition and economic 
potential that makes moves in structure possible (Schumpeter, 1911; Kuznets, 1970; Timmer 
and Szirmai, 2000).
 As a measure of labour productivity we will use the value added per working hour. In order 
to receive reliable conclusions, industry-specific PPP should be adopted. Despite generally 
high tradability among all manufacturing industries, the price levels and their changes remain 
significantly diversified (Tyrväinen, 1998; Van Biesebroeck, 2009; Inklaar and Timmer, 2009). 
Therefore, we employ a deflating technique proposed by Inklaar and Timmer (2009) and make 
use of two (connected) databases on productivity. The GGDC Productivity Level Database 
(Inklaar and Timmer, 2008) provides us with data on single-deflated productivities in 2-digit 
industries, in relation to US levels in 1997, while from the EU-KLEMS database we obtain 
indices of productivity growth for the whole period of analysis. On this basis we calculate 
productivity levels in each year, every country and industry.
 Our notation is as follows (all values refer to year t):  - γi,j,t single deflated value added per 
working hour in country i in industry j, in relation to US levels;  - γi,t  single deflated value added 
per working hour in the European Union in industry j, in relation to US levels. In order to find 
productivity levels in total manufacturing in country i (and as well for some industries, where 
no aggregate productivity is provided) we need to calculate this on a weighted-average basis:
γi,t = Σj ωi,j,t γi,j,t ,                                                                                                                                 (2)
where ωi,j,t                                   is the share of industry j in total employment (HEMPE stands for number 
of hours worked in a year by persons engaged in an industry). Analogously, γi,t  will refer to 
productivity in manufacturing in the European Union.
 Due to data availability, the manufacturing sector will be decomposed into eleven 2-digit 
industries. Following Peneder (2007) and Eurostat’s approach, the classifications of those 
industries according to their educational intensity and technology level are presented in 
Appendix 1.
 Our analysis will be conducted for two samples: for EU-14 (old member states excl. 
Luxembourg) for 1970–2006 and for EU-22 (European Union members since 2004, excl. 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) for 1995–2006. Some countries were excluded due to the 
small size of their economies, which makes analysis at the disaggregated level difficult. For 
β-convergence, where data allowed, regressions were calculated until 20074.
3.2. σ-convergence Decomposition
Following Esteban (1999), we employ an augmented shift-share decomposition for a measure 
of productivity inequalities at the aggregate level. For each country and in every year, we 
decompose a relative difference between its productivity and the European average into 
three elements in the following way:
4 Analyses of σ-convergence require data for full sample, while ones of β-convergence can be conducted even with 
some data points missing.
 _ HEMPEi,j,t
 = HEMPEi,t
γi,t–γt    Σj(ωi,j,tγi,j,t–ωi,tγj,t)     Σjωj,t(γi,j,t–γj,t)    Σjγj,t(ωi,j,t–ωj,t)      Σj(ωi,j,t-ωj,t)(γi,j,t–γj,t)––––– = ––––––––––––––––  = ––––––––––––– + –––––––––––––  + –––––––––––––––––––  = πi,t + μi,t + αi,t ,    (3)    γt                                 γt                                                  γt                                           γt                                                          γt
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Therefore, the distance in productivity between each country and the European average can 
be decomposed into three elements:
•		 Productivity	differential	πi,t – which measures pure differences in productivity within 
particular industries, holding the employment structure constant. It shows what would 
be the difference between the economies had they had the same employment structures.
•	 Industry	mix	μi,t – which measures the role of structural differences, this time holding 
the productivity levels constant. It shows what would be the difference between the 
economies if they had the same productivities in all industries. We can expect that it will 
be strongly and positively correlated with πi, since the concentration of economic activity 
in more productive industries should accompany general development.
•	 Allocation	component	αi,t – which measures whether a country specializes in industries 
in which it is relatively efficient. Its value shows whether a country makes use of its 
comparative advantages and it probably is to a high extent a consequence of the 
institutional network and of the industrial policy of a country, not necessarily correlated 
with the other two. 
The contribution of these three elements to productivity inequalities in Europe can be 
distinguished by making use of a coefficient of mean absolute deviation:
where: dt– mean absolute deviation of productivity in year t.; πt , μt , αt  are average absolute 
values of πi,t, μi,t , αi,t , which were described above. Their interpretation is analogous – they 
represent the contribution of the productivity-differential, industry-mix and allocation 
components to productivity dispersion in the sample in year t.
 The coefficient of the mean absolute deviation, though unusual for analysing convergence, 
for our descriptive purposes has some advantages over the coefficient of variation or 
logarithmic deviation (compared to e.g. Papalia and Bertarelli, 2008). Firstly, it does not lead 
to systematic errors at the moment of the disaggregation of total into industry-level 
productivity, as a measure based on logarithms would. Secondly, it gives outcomes directly 
in linear units, which are easier to interpret and thus preferable to quadratic ones, which 
would be obtained by the use of a coefficient of variation. The only problematic issue is the 
residual term, which will appear when the three elements: πi , μi , αi do not have the same 
sign, which means that differences in productivity are not perfectly correlated with structural 
or allocation differences.
 The values of Vd and its components will be calculated for the EU-14 (old member states 
excl. Luxembourg) for 1970–2006 and for the EU-22 (excl. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) 
for 1995–2006. The exclusion of some countries was undertaken due to small size of their 
economies, which makes analysis at the disaggregated level difficult. Trends in Vd  and its 
components will inform us about the occurrence of σ-convergence and its characteristics – 
whether we can attribute it to changes in structural differences or productivity differences 
within industries. In addition, a more detailed investigation of the values πi , μi and αi for 
each country will be conducted.
      
–
 dt     Σi
N|γi,t–γt|     Σi
N|πi,t+μi,t+αi,t|    Σi
N|πi,t|   Σi
N|μi,t|    Σi
N|αi,t|Vt
d –– = –––––––––  = ––––––––––––––– + –––––– + –––––– + ––––––– + residualt = πt + μt + αt+ residualt ,  (4)      – γt                    N γt                                   N                                  N                N                      N
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3.3. Aggregate Growth Rate Decomposition and β-convergence
In order to capture the dynamic aspect of the analysed processes and to verify theoretical 
predictions about productivity convergence, a similar decomposition of growth rates will be 
conducted (e.g. Fagerberg, 2000; Krűger, 2010). This time γ0 will stand for productivity at the 
beginning of a period and γ1 at the end of the period. It can be shown that growth rate in 
total productivity can be decomposed into three elements:
                                                                                                                                                          ,  (5)
                                                                         Within (W)            Static-shift (S)    Dynamic-shift (D)
where:                is productivity in industry j, relative to productivity in total manufacturing 
in country i; ϑi,j,t is productivity growth in industry j; and Δωi,j,t––ωi,j,t– ωi,j,t-1  measures change 
of employment share of industry j.
 Hence, we receive a decomposition of the total productivity growth rate into three 
components:
•	 Within	 effect	 (W) – this is an average productivity growth in each of the industries, 
holding the employment weights  constant and weighting by their relative productivities. 
Its value refers to the pace of productivity growth had no structural change taken place;
•	 Static-shift	effect	(S) – an effect of shifts of employment  between industries, weighting 
by their initial productivities. It measures the results of the structural change in its static 
sense – if S > 0, then labour moved on average into industries that were initially relatively 
highly productive (high γi,j,t-1). It could be an effect of allocative efficiency (in a static 
sense) and it constitutes a “structural bonus” for the economy;
•	 Dynamic-shift	effect	(D) – combination of the two previous effects, which informs us 
about dynamic effects of structural change. If D > 0, then shifts of employment had the 
direction into industries that were the most dynamic during the period in consideration. 
However, a negative D would support the “structural burden hypothesis”, which stands that 
labour in time concentrates in less dynamic industries (Fagerberg, 2000; Peneder, 2003).
 
Decomposition (5) is highly fragile in response to the length of the basic period of analysis. 
If ϑi,t is a one-year growth rate, the W-component accounts for almost all of the total growth 
and the longer the period, the larger the share of both structural components. In our analysis 
we chose a 10-year period, which is a standard in explaining economic growth – it smoothens 
growth rate amplitude, but also allows us to observe substantial structural shifts.
 β-convergence analysis can, and usually does, refer only to the aggregate growth rate. 
However, we can also investigate whether the structural changes were more beneficial for 
countries with low or with high initial productivity. Our basic approach to analysing 
β-convergence will be as follows:
ϑi,t= α + β(ln γM,t-1 – ln γi,t-1) + εi,t  ,                                                                                                  (6)
where ϑi,t  is average productivity growth rate in a 10-year period t in country i.
     
–
 γi,t–γi,t-1         Σj(ωi,j,tγi,j,t–ωi,j,t-1γi,j,t-1)ϑi,t ––––––––= ––––––––––––––––––––
 = Σj(γi,j,t-1ϑi,j,tωi,j,t-1)+Σj(γi,j,t-1Δωi,j,t)+Σj(γi,j,t-1ϑi,j,tΔωi,j,t)
     
–    γi,t                                  Σjωi,j,t-1γi,j,t-1
˜
˜
˜ ˜
      
–
 γi,j,t γi,j,t ––––
 
     
 – γi,t ˜
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This relates the average 10-year growth rate in the manufacturing sector to lagged distance 
in productivity from the leader. β-convergence in its most general version takes place if the 
β parameter is positive, which means that countries initially further from the productivity 
frontier tend to grow faster (Cameron et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2012). α will stand for average 
‘frontier growth’, i.e. rate of growth in the leading economy. We take account of the fact that 
the leading economy might change in the period of analysis – each time γM,t-1  will refer to the 
productivity of the economy leading in period t-1.
 Analogous regressions will be conducted for the growth rate in each industry j, which 
will potentially let us identify areas of convergence and of divergence:
ϑi,j,t= α + β(ln γM,j,t-1 – ln γi,j,t-1) + εi,j,t  ,                                                                                                  (7)
Parameter β has the following interpretation: a country initially x-times more developed 
than the other, will experience on average a growth rate of productivity lower by (β ln x). For 
instance, if β=0.02, then a country more developed by 10% can expect a growth rate lower 
by (0.02*ln 1.1); that is, by 0.19 percentage points.
 A similar analysis will be conducted for three distinguished components of the 10-year 
growth rates: Wi,t , Si,t , Di,t. Taking growth components as dependent variables will tell us 
whether structural shifts were relatively more beneficial for catching-up countries; that is, 
whether they supported or maybe counteracted productivity convergence. Those regressions 
will be as follows:
Wi,t= α + β(ln γM,t-1 – ln γi,t-1) + εi,t  ,                                                                                                 (8)
In order to keep correspondence between its results and the decomposition (5), Gi,j,t will be a 
regular (not logarithmic) average growth rate in rolling 10-year periods. For robustness, 
5-year periods will be controlled as well, which especially for the EU-22 sample can enhance 
the reliability of the results. We will also conduct regressions in a sample excluding Ireland, 
as tax and legal issues in this country might heavily influence the data on productivity. 
Separate parameter values for each industry indicate that we assume heterogeneity in 
convergence processes.
 To allow for time heterogeneity of the leader’s growth in an industry, we will also make 
use of period dummies  and check for structural breaks in β parameter – running Chow test:
dependent variable = αj + βj(ln γM,j,t-1 – ln γi,j,t-1) + μt + εi,j,t    ,                                                                                            (9)
In the sample of EU-22 countries we will also check for the heterogeneity of the β parameter 
between the eight Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries and the rest, running the 
following regression:
dependent variable = αj+NCEEβj
NCEE(ln γM,j,t-1– ln γi,j,t-1)+CEEβj
CEE(ln γM,j,t-1– ln γi,j,t-1) + εi,j,t   ,(10)
where CEE equals 1 for CEE countries and 0 for others (and NCEE oppositely). 
All equations will be estimated using the panel data ordinary least square method, with 
Arellano robust standard errors in order to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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4. Results
4.1. σ-convergence Results
The coefficient of mean absolute deviation for EU-14 countries was quite stable until 1991 
and has experienced a continuous and sharp growth since then (see Figure 1). σ-convergence 
took place mostly in the period 1980–1987. Most of the observed differences between 
countries can be attributed to different productivities within industries – the π component 
accounts for over 80% of the deviation coefficient and is responsible for its growth since 
1991. Industry-mix and allocation components were responsible for a much smaller part of 
the differences and both were growing as well. The remaining residual informs us that the 
three elements were not perfectly correlated with each other, which means that economic 
structure in some cases neutralised pure productivity differences within industries. 
Figure 1. Trends of the Coefficient of Mean Absolute Deviation and its Components, 
                Labour Productivity, EU-14, 1970–2006
Source: Author’s preparation, calculations based on GGDC Productivity Level Database and EU-KLEMS
Figure 2. Trends of the Coefficient of Mean Absolute Deviation and its Components, 
                 Labour Productivity, EU-22, 1995–2006
Source: Author’s preparation, calculations based on GGDC Productivity Level Database and EU-KLEMS
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 Respective values for the EU-22 are, expectedly, much higher and also have been growing 
slowly, which points to σ-divergence (Figure 2). Here, the role of the productivity differential 
is even higher and it explains about 90% of total differences. Both figures indicate that, 
generally, productivity differences have a sector-wide character and that productivity 
disparities are only to a limited extent a result of detrimental specialisation patterns in less 
developed economies. This result is largely in line with other decomposition analyses 
(Esteban, 1999).
 Levels of productivity inequalities, but also their tendencies, varied across industries 
(Table 1). In the EU-14 until the most recent period, the majority of industries had exhibited 
much higher inequalities than total manufacturing. This means that different countries are 
good at different types of economic activity, which diminishes disparities at the level of the 
whole sector. We can observe quite similar trends for EU-14 and EU-22 with convergence 
industries being: Non-Metallic Minerals, Metals, Machinery, Transport Equipment and 
Recycling. Divergence took place continuously in Textiles and in Chemicals, while Food, 
Wood, Paper and Electrical and Optical Equipment had U-shaped paths of inequalities, 
with dynamic growth in them since the late 90s.
 Very simple explanations, like those relating linear convergence to the technology level of 
an industry, do not hold here. It looks like divergence took place either in high-tech industries 
or in traditional, labour-intensive low-tech industries. At this moment we can pose a hypothesis 
for further research that more efficient economies were able to introduce capital-intensive 
methods and reduce employment in low-tech industries, while at the same time they adopted 
new, frontier technologies in modern industries. In less-developed countries traditional 
industries remain organised with labour-intensive methods (European Commission, 2012). 
Convergence occurred mainly in medium-technology, heavy industries, with high levels of 
internationalisation; however, this should also be the subject of further analysis.
Table 1. The Coefficient of Mean Absolute Deviation by Industry
Industry
EU-14 EU-22
1970 1982 1994 2006 1995 2000 2006
Total Manufacturing 0.215 0.219 0.200 0.385 0.472 0.491 0.510
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.297 0.285 0.243 0.395 0.481 0.470 0.499
Textiles, Textile, Leather and Footwear 0.205 0.244 0.256 0.421 0.533 0.553 0.610
Wood and of Wood and Cork 0.437 0.341 0.377 0.434 0.568 0.551 0.556
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.288 0.185 0.226 0.402 0.437 0.499 0.490
Chemical, Rubber, Plastics and Fuel 0.287 0.311 0.311 0.479 0.491 0.553 0.563
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 0.239 0.209 0.199 0.183 0.406 0.341 0.297
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.499 0.265 0.227 0.232 0.444 0.408 0.344
Machinery, N.e.c. 0.352 0.266 0.235 0.267 0.463 0.424 0.395
Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.337 0.286 0.241 0.669 0.428 0.506 0.739
Transport Equipment 0.384 0.333 0.327 0.314 0.497 0.453 0.413
Manufacturing N.e.c.; Recycling 0.455 0.402 0.392 0.330 0.529 0.498 0.451
Note:  N.e.c. stands for “nowhere else classified”
Source: Author’s calculations.
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A more detailed analysis leads us to further insights about the nature of convergence. High 
productivity was strongly and positively correlated with beneficent economic structure – the 
correlation coefficient between π and μ components reached on average 0.75. It is an expected 
result, indicating that economic activity shifts to more productive industries alongside the 
development path. The allocation component at different periods either strengthened or 
countervailed the productivity differences. In 1980–1994, allocation efficiency was relatively 
improving in less-developed countries, but from 1994 an opposite trend was observable. 
This means that highly-developed countries exhibited positive structural changes and 
became more specialised in industries that gave them a comparative advantage. Analogous 
implications can be made for the enlarged European Union.
 The hierarchy of countries based on the criterion of aggregate productivity changed 
seriously during the period of analysis. France, Germany, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, which were the initial leaders, now take places in the middle of the scale, whereas 
Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Belgium have become the new leaders. Portugal and Greece 
are still lagging seriously behind the rest of the European Union. The distribution of 
productivity differences has become much more fat-tailed – both lagging and leading 
countries are now much further away from the average than they were in 1970 (Figure 3). 
Additionally, the allocation component benefits two groups of countries the most – 
productivity leaders and laggards. Altogether, a sharp division into two clubs of countries 
has taken shape: low-productivity, low-tech-specialised on the one hand, and high-
productivity, high-tech-specialised on the other. It is also apparent that both groups consist 
of small economies, with big European countries situated in the middle of the scale.
Figure 3. Decomposition of Differences in Productivity from the EU Average, EU-14, 1970 and 2006
Source: Author’s preparation
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 Now, let us turn to a comparison of productivities in the EU-22 sample. Firstly, in 1995 a 
very strict division into two groups was apparent. The transition economies, together with 
Portugal and Greece, formed a club that lagged behind the rest of the EU and specialised in 
low-productivity industries. Until 2006, Central and Eastern Europe countries had reduced 
much of its distance to the EU average, overtaking Greece and Portugal and getting close to 
Spain. Most of this catching-up can be attributed to the reduction of the productivity-
differential component, while structural differences remained significant. Only some 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) experienced positive structural change, 
which possibly can be beneficial for them in the future. On the other hand, the structure of 
manufacturing in Baltic countries is a detrimental factor for their productivity and in this 
sense makes them similar to Greece and Portugal.
Figure 4. Decomposition of Differences in Productivity from the EU Average, EU-22, 1995 and 2006
Source: Author’s preparation
4.2. β-convergence Results  
The basic results of growth rate decomposition for the EU-14 are demonstrated in Table 2, 
which presents for every country: an average 10-year productivity growth (in rolling periods) 
and its three components reflecting the productivity growth within industries, and static 
and dynamic aspects of structural change. It is visible that productivity growth accounted 
for the majority of the total values and that shifts in structure did not play a large role. This 
is in line with Fagerberg’s (2000) insight that contemporary technical change is rather 
employment saving than employment expanding. All countries benefited from a structural 
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bonus (S>0), while structural burden (D<0) was negligible. However, it is also apparent that 
the three most dynamic countries in the whole period benefited the most from shifting 
employment to dynamic industries – this was in some sense a necessary condition to become 
a leading economy. On the other hand, the static-shift element was not that strongly 
correlated with the aggregate growth rate. Countries like Germany, France or the United 
Kingdom were in the second half of the scale regarding the average growth rate, even though 
they experienced significant shifts to highly-productive industries. 
Table 2. Decomposition of 10-year Labour Productivity Growth Rates, Average Values, 
              EU-14 Countries 1970–2007
Country
Average 10-year 
growth rate
Average values of components
Within (W) Static-shift (S) Dynamic-shift (D)
Ireland 103.9% 91.5% 3.1% 9.3%
Finland 69.1% 62.1% 2.1% 4.9%
Belgium 59.1% 54.9% 1.8% 2.3%
Austria 51.9% 49.6% 1.7% 0.5%
Sweden 49.8% 49.1% 0.2% 0.4%
Netherlands 43.1% 42.5% 0.9% -0.4%
Portugal 35.4% 35.2% 0.0% 0.2%
United Kingdom 35.3% 32.2% 3.7% -0.5%
Italy 34.9% 33.7% 1.7% -0.4%
Germany 32.1% 29.7% 2.1% 0.3%
Spain 29.7% 28.9% 0.9% -0.1%
France 28.7% 26.5% 2.0% 0.2%
Denmark 22.6% 20.9% 1.1% 0.5%
Greece 22.0% 20.1% 1.2% 0.7%
Note:  Countries are ordered by decreasing average growth rate.
Source: Author’s calculations
Now, we move on to discuss the results of the estimation of β-convergence equations (Table 
3). In total manufacturing, as expected, we observed β-divergence (negative β value). This 
process was not stable over time, which is reflected by the significance of time-dummies and 
by the structural break indicated by Chow’s test. The latter occurred around 1989 – before 
this year β was positive (but very small), but since 1989 more developed countries have been 
improving their productivity faster than the lagging ones. The descriptive power of the 
simple convergence model is very low, which means that factors other than sector-wide 
catching-up mechanisms determined the actual growth rates.
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Table 3. Results of the Estimation of β-convergence for Manufacturing Industries, EU-14, 1970–2007
              Dependent Variable: Average Productivity Growth Rate in 10-year Rolling Periods
No time-dummies Time-dummies Structural breaks
Industry
β 
(t distribution) R
2 β
(t distribution) R
2 β
1. Total manufacturing
-0.0237*
(1.932)
0.022
-0.0225**
(-2.017)
0.074
Before 1989: 0.0032
After 1989: -0.0629*
2. Industries
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco
0.0075
(1.377)
0.036
0.0066
(1.255)
0.102
Before 1989: 0.0079
After 1989: 0.0047
Textiles, Textile, Leather 
and Footwear
-0.0014
(-0.186)
0.001
0.0001
(0.010)
0.076
Before 1989: 0.0074
After 1989: -0.0178**
Wood and of Wood 
and Cork
0.0101*
(1.935)
0.037
0.0106*
(1.935)
0.068
Before 1989: 0.0182**
After 1989: -0.0088*
Pulp, Paper, Printing 
and Publishing
0.0051
(0.622)
0.006
0.0049
(0.563)
0.050
Before 1985: 0.0231**
After 1985: -0.0182**
Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastics and Fuel
0.0026
(0.212)
0.001
0.0029
(0.231)
0.044
Before 1985: 0.0215
After 1985: -0.0163
Other Non-Metallic 
Mineral
0.0282***
(5.795)
0.204
0.0292***
(5.364)
0.286 No breaks
Basic Metals and 
Fabricated Metal
0.0173**
(2.527)
0.225
0.0307**
(2.190)
0.328
Before 1985: 0.0297**
After 1985: 0.0138
Machinery, N.e.c.
0.0232*
(1.849)
0.141
0.0232*
(1.956)
0.205
Before 1985: 0.0337**
After 1985: 0.0059
Electrical and 
Optical Equipment
0.0327**
(2.190)
0.129
0.0526***
(4.141)
0.293
Before 1994: 0.0402***
After 1994: -0.0194*
Transport Equipment
0.0205***
(9.165)
0.178
0.0209***
(8.995)
0.238
Before 1989: 0.0097**
After 1989: 0.0356
Manufacturing N.e.c; 
Recycling
0.0189***
(4.051)
0.208
0.0200***
(3.646)
0.244
Before 1991: 0.0210***
After 1991: 0.104
Note:  *** - significance at 0.01 level; ** - sign. at 0.05 level; * - sign. at 0.1 level
Source: Author’s calculations
Analysis at the level of individual industries shows great heterogeneity of β values and of 
their significance. However, almost all of them are positive, which implies that convergence 
at industry level was on average more typical, contrary to the aggregate level. This is a very 
important result, for which we can propose some hypothetical explanations. Firstly, in some 
industries β-convergence coincided with σ-divergence, which indicates that an effect of 
regression towards the mean took place (Quah, 1993). Secondly, we can suspect that, 
analogously to σ-convergence, the distribution of the performance of countries differed 
across industries. If one of the leading countries, for instance France, reduced its productivity 
gap in an industry in which it lagged behind the leader, it actually contributed to divergence 
in the whole manufacturing sector. Thirdly, different specialisation patterns in European 
economies might have played a significant role for divergence in total manufacturing. This 
last hypothesis will be evaluated in a subsequent part of the article.
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 Analogously to the interpretation of σ-convergence (see Table 1), the industries with 
diminishing inequalities were: the manufacturing of Wood, Non-Metallic Minerals, Metals, 
Machinery, Transport Equipment and Others, but also Electronics and Optical Equipment. 
On the other hand, industries that exhibited divergence in a σ sense, here have positive, yet 
very small and insignificant β values. When we check for structural breaks, we receive a 
more complex view and an explanation of those contradictory results. In many industries, 
the most prominent example being Electronics and Optical Equipment, the β parameter 
changes its value from positive in 1970s and 1980s to negative in the most recent period5. 
This confirms one of the conclusions from the σ-convergence analysis, namely the divergent 
trends of productivity growth in the EU-14 from roughly 1990 on.
 The β-convergence analysis conducted for three components of growth rates seems to 
confirm our hypothesis (Table 4). For the within the component, we receive a negative and 
insignificant β, with a structural break in 1989, which is in accordance with the results in 
Table 3. What is important is that the static-shift component worked in favour of the more 
developed countries, which means that they managed to improve their labour allocation 
better than lagging economies. This might explain β-divergence in manufacturing with 
β-convergence in its industries. The close to zero estimation of β for the dynamic-shift 
component suggests that on average there was no significant relation between its value and 
the productivity level.
Table 4. Results of the Estimation of β-convergence for Growth Rate Components, EU-14, 1970–2006
No time-dummies Time-dummies Structural breaks
Growth rate component β (t distribution) R2 β (t distribution) R2 β
Within
-0.0138
(-0.178)
0.000
-0.0202
(-0.262)
0.035
Before 1989: 0.0981
After 1989: -0.1923**
Static-shift
-0.0099**
(-1.993)
0.056
-0.0108**
(-2.302)
0.124 No breaks
Dynamic-shift
-0.0080
(-1.042)
0.009
-0.0091
(-1.209)
0.070 No breaks
Source:  Author’s calculations
A similar analysis will be presented for the EU-22 countries, with the special qualification of 
eight transition economies (Table 5). Here, the data are based only on 2–3 10-year periods, so 
they have to be interpreted with much caution. Nevertheless, what is outstanding here is a very 
diffuse distribution of growth rates. Productivity in manufacturing in some of the transition 
economies grew in the 10-year period on average by 170–180%, while Italy and Spain 
experienced almost no growth at all. Virtually all growth in the most dynamic economies can 
be assigned to productivity changes within industries, with little role of structural shifts. This 
suggests that the space for catching-up on the part of Central and Eastern Europe was large 
and distributed among industries. On the other hand, countries in this region, which were 
initially more developed (i.e. Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia), benefited a lot from 
employment shifts to more dynamic industries. Those three countries are described by the 
5 We run the Chow test for different years. Presented results refer to a year with the highest significance of the test.
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European Commission (2012) as relatively innovative economies, with technology and capital-
driven growth – in comparison to, for instance, Poland or Latvia which specialise in labour-
intensive, low-tech activities. Only some of the Western countries managed to reach growth 
rates similar to those of transition economies, while most of them grew at a much lower pace. 
Sweden seems to be an interesting case for further research, as it experienced very large 
improvements in productivity, despite detrimental structural changes.
Table 5. Decomposition of 10-year Labour Productivity Growth Rates, Average Values, 
              EU-22 Countries 1995–2007
Country
Average 10-year 
growth rate
Average values of components
Within (W) Static-shift (S) Dynamic-shift (D)
Poland 183.7% 179.4% 3.9% 0.4%
Lithuania 169.3% 165.6% 1.6% 2.2%
Slovakia 169.1% 181.6% -4.0% -8.5%
Sweden 120.2% 127.8% 1.0% -8.6%
Ireland 113.3% 99.6% 7.1% 6.5%
Hungary 98.2% 83.4% 0.7% 14.0%
Latvia 96.1% 85.6% 4.4% 6.0%
Finland 92.8% 85.2% 0.2% 7.3%
Slovenia 89.3% 78.8% 5.1% 5.3%
Czech Republic 88.0% 77.7% 2.9% 7.4%
Estonia 78.0% 83.7% 1.4% -7.1%
Austria 61.8% 59.6% 1.7% 0.5%
France 50.6% 47.0% 3.0% 0.5%
United Kingdom 44.9% 44.0% 2.8% -1.8%
Netherlands 43.3% 43.1% 0.3% -0.1%
Germany 36.5% 35.8% 0.9% -0.1%
Portugal 33.4% 30.3% 2.7% 0.5%
Belgium 33.4% 30.8% 2.3% 0.2%
Greece 32.4% 26.7% 2.5% 3.2%
Denmark 26.8% 23.1% 1.6% 2.1%
Spain 11.6% 9.4% 2.2% 0.1%
Italy 7.1% 4.8% 2.3% 0.0%
Note:  Countries are ordered by decreasing average growth rate
Source:  Author’s calculations
 β-convergence took place in total manufacturing and in all of its industries, with 
parameters significant in 8 out of 11 cases (Table 6). It was the fastest in medium-low 
technology, heavy industries and the slowest in either high-tech (Chemicals, Electronics) or 
in low-tech industries (Food, Textiles). Now we will present the results for 5-year rolling 
periods, which allows us to check for structural breaks (and does not change general 
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conclusions). In those industries where structural breaks took place, the Chow test was of 
the highest significance in 1999. Results of this test indicate that the first half of the period 
of analysis was in general characterised by higher β values. This means that divergence was 
the most pronounced in 1995–1999. In this case, time-dummies were insignificant (probably 
due to the much shorter period), so their results were omitted.
Table 6. Results of Estimation of β-convergence for Manufacturing Industries, EU-22, 1995–2007
              Dependent Variable: Average Productivity Growth Rate in 5-year Rolling Periods
Homogeneous parameters With CEE-dummies
Industry code
β
(t distribution)
R2
Structural break in 
1999 – β values
βNCEE
(t distribution)
βCEE
(t distribution)
R2
1. Total
0.0169**
(2.462)
0.167 No break
-0.0204**
(-2.449)
0.0132**
(2.147)
0.358
2. Industries
Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco
0.0045
(1.3283)
0.029
Before: 0.0079**
After: 0.0007
-0.0046 
(-1.4261)
0.0038 
(1.1271)
0.072
Textiles, Textile, 
Leather and Footwear
0.0067*
(1.6652)
0.098 No breaks
-0.0056 
(-0.949)
0.0046
(1.22)
0.158
Wood and of Wood 
and Cork
0.0135***
(2.8288)
0.221
Before: 0.0160***
After: 0.0107
-0.0046 
(-1.3361)
0.0131*** 
(3.386)
0.417
Pulp, Paper, Printing 
and Publishing
0.0094**
(2.4271)
0.160
Before: 0.0143***
After : 0.043***
-0.0053 
(-0.9327)
0.0074** 
(2.145)
0.254
Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastics and Fuel
0.0102
(1.2634)
0.125 No breaks
-0.0038 
(-0.67)
0.0077 
(1.069)
0.210
Other Non-Metallic 
Mineral
0.0338***
(4.7225)
0.449 No breaks
0.0148* 
(1.7573)
0.0309*** 
(4.64)
0.494
Basic Metals and 
Fabricated Metal
0.0239***
(3.7531)
0.326
Before: 0.0164***
After : 0.0320
0.0102** 
(2.0509)
0.0228*** 
(3.948)
0.346
Machinery, N.e.c.
0.0226***
(5.9098)
0.545
Before: 0.0219
After: 0.0236 
0.0034 
(0.8062)
0.0213*** 
(6.127)
0.611
Electrical and Optical 
Equipment
0.0077
(1.0912)
0.045
Before : 0.0146
After : 0.0030
-0.0134 
(-1.3578)
0.0052
(0.78)
0.115
Transport Equipment
0.0267***
(3.9028)
0.470 No breaks
0.0093*** 
(2.4875)
0.0261*** 
(4.196)
0.535
Manufacturing N.e.c; 
Recycling
0.0168**
(2.1993)
0.188
Before : 0.0126***
After: 0.0146
0.0029 
(0.4456)
0.0158** 
(2.279)
0.233
Source:  Author’s calculations
Allowing for parameter heterogeneity for the CEE countries leads us to more reliable results, 
with R2 significantly higher in all cases. At the level of whole manufacturing, catching-up 
took place only in Central and Eastern Europe, while in the group of old EU members strong 
divergent tendencies occurred. Similarly to previous analyses (Tables 3 and 4), in Western 
Europe there was convergence in only three industries (Non-Metallic Minerals, Metals, 
Transport Equipment). However, divergent trends in the remaining industries were slow 
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and insignificant, which means that economic structure must have benefited more developed 
countries, so that β in total manufacturing exceeds -0.0200. 
 The positive β indicates that convergence took place in the region of Central and Eastern 
Europe. This process was common for all manufacturing industries, though its speed was 
diversified. In Non-Metallic Minerals, Machinery and Transport Equipment industries it 
was the fastest, while in Food, Textiles, Chemicals and Electronics – the slowest.
Table 7. Results of Estimation of β-convergence for Growth Rate Components, EU-22, 1995–2007
Homogeneous model With CEE-dummies
Growth rate 
component
β
(t distribution)
R2
βNCEE
(t distribution)
βCEE
(t distribution)
R2
Within
0.3247***
(3.010)
0.280
-0.2639**
(2.216)
0.2743***
(2.737)
0.428
Static-shift
-0.0024
(0.433)
0.008
-0.0005
(0.052)
-0.0023
(-0.406)
0.008
Dynamic-shift
0.0015
(0.101)
0.000
-0.0013
(-0.619)
0.0002
(0.017)
0.008
Source:  Author’s calculations
Table 7 presents the relation between the initial productivity gap and growth components in 
10-year rolling periods and confirms the conclusions from Tables 5 and 6. In the homogenous 
sample, β-convergence of the within component is confirmed. Introduction of CEE-
dummies changes the picture: productivities were diverging in Western Europe and 
converging in the new EU members. In all cases, the two structural components of growth 
rate were in a very weak relation to initial productivity.
4.3. The Case of Ireland
To check for the robustness of our basic results, we rerun all the calculations on smaller 
samples, with Ireland excluded. Ireland was one of the best performing countries in the 
European Union: it managed not only to catch up to the European average, but also to jump 
ahead and become the leader in overall productivity. As was presented, in the period of 
analysis it benefited heavily from structural changes and from improved allocation of 
resources. However, those results might be to some extent a consequence of its tax and legal 
regulations, which allow the multinational corporations to register income without placing 
real production in this country6. As stated in the 2012 Industrial Performance Scoreboard 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 8): “Ireland’s productivity level is to a significant extent 
inflated by the operations of foreign multinationals, in particular in the chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals sectors. The very high values are likely to be affected by R&D and marketing 
activities undertaken mainly outside Ireland, and by transfer pricing activities.”
 Our calculations support this view: since early 90s Ireland started to increase its 
productivity highly over the European average – in total manufacturing and in a few specific 
industries. Apart from the Chemical Industry in which Irish productivity, at least officially, 
6 In early 2000’s Ireland used to be place by IMF on its Offshore Financial Centers list.
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even exceeded 500% of the European average, its leadership was the most pronounced in 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco and in Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing industries. By the 
beginning of the 21st century, productivity in Irish manufacturing reached over 200% of the 
EU-14 average. To what extent this was a result of real industrial development is a question 
for another study – here we will simply present those results that differ significantly when 
Ireland is excluded from the sample. 
 Recalculations of both σ- and β-convergence decompositions show that the results differ 
most significantly for total manufacturing and for the three aforementioned industries. 
About a third of the growth of total inequalities since 1990 can be attributed to Ireland; the 
same situation exists in regard to its productivity-differential and allocative components. 
Nonetheless, the most important outcome of the research, namely the productivity 
divergence, is sustained. The comparison of the coefficient of mean absolute deviation and 
its allocation component for two samples is presented in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Comparison of Inequalities in EU-14 and EU-13 (without Ireland) – Coefficient of Mean 
                Absolute Deviation and its Allocation Component
Source: Author’s calculations
At the sectoral level, analyses of both σ- and β-convergence show that the exclusion of 
Ireland from the sample makes the productivity divergence after 1990 much less pronounced 
in three industries: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing and 
the Chemical Industry. Nonetheless, most of the results and implications about productivity 
differences and their tendencies remain unchanged.
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5. Conclusions
The article’s most important result is that the conclusion by Bernard and Jones (1996a, 
1996b) of no convergence in manufacturing also holds for the European Union. However, 
the view of productivity convergence we present is much more complex, with important 
heterogeneities in reference to time, industry and country and with many diversified patterns 
of growth. Therefore, we can conclude that catching-up is not automatic, but rather a highly 
conditional process with many country and industry-based characteristics at play.
 Most of the productivity differences between the manufacturing sectors of EU countries 
are the result of dispersed development level within particular industries, and not the 
different internal compositions of the sector. This suggests that industry productivity is to a 
great extent determined by more general horizontal factors. Economic structure reinforces 
those differences, as catching up is usually accompanied by shifts from low-tech, traditional 
industries to modern ones. Such changes took place in those countries that became new 
productivity leaders – in Belgium, Finland and Ireland. Their high dynamics, accompanied 
by the stagnant growth in southern European countries, led to the formation of two clubs of 
countries, each of them achieving their comparative advantage. Greece and Portugal, but 
also Spain and Italy, did not manage to adopt beneficial structural change and traditional 
industries remain very strong there. This poses a large barrier for the development of the 
whole manufacturing sector, as low-tech industries are more vulnerable to international 
competition. CEE countries dynamically reduced their productivity gap; however, with little 
employment shifts across industries. It seems that clustering is taking place in this region as 
well, as differences between Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia (‘high-tech’ club) and 
Poland and the Baltics (‘low-tech’ club) are increasing.
 Medium-tech industries were those in which convergence was significant and constant 
over time. Since the late 80s and early 90s, productivities in most low-tech and high-tech 
industries were diverging, except for in Central and Eastern Europe, and strongly influenced 
divergence at the aggregate level. Diverse mechanisms probably stand behind those 
observations, possibly related to the spread of a new technological paradigm (Perez, 1983) 
and faster adoption of ICT technologies in more developed countries.
 Two important research directions emerge from the described picture. Firstly, what are 
the crucial differences between industries that allow for or block convergence? Possibly, 
referring to micro-level data and the processes of firm development will help us find answers 
for this question. Secondly, what mechanisms allowed Ireland and Finland to develop 
dynamically, with substantial and positive structural shifts, while Greece and Portugal 
lagged behind? Did entrepreneurs respond to given factor endowments and institutions or 
did perhaps some patterns of behaviour allow them to induce a structural shift and further 
socioeconomic adjustments? What was the role of public policies in the catching-up 
processes? Providing answers in this area seems crucial from the point of view of the long-
term development of Central and Eastern European countries, because structural differences 
are starting to take shape within this group and this indicates possible differences in long-
term growth paths across the region.
GRODZICKI
27
REB 2013
Vol. 5, No. 2
References
Abramovitz, M. 1986. Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind. The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 385-406.
Bah, E.M. and Brada, J.C. 2009. Total Factor Productivity Growth, Structural Change and 
Convergence in the New Members of the European Union. Comparative Economic 
Studies, Vol. 51, No 4, pp. 421-446.
Barro, R.J. 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2, pp. 407-443.
Barro, R.J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1990. Economic Growth and Convergence across the 
United States. NBER Working Papers, No. 3419.
Baumol, W.J. 1986. Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare: What the Long-Run 
Data Show. The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No 5, pp. 1072-1085.
Ben-David, D. 1996. Trade and Convergence among Countries. Journal of International 
Economics, No. 40, pp. 279–298.
Bernard, A.B. and Jones, C.I. 1996a. Comparing Apples to Oranges: Productivity 
Convergence and Measurement Across Industries and Countries. The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 5, pp. 1216-1238.
Bernard, A.B. and Jones, C.I. 1996b. Productivity Across Industries and Countries: Time Series 
Theory and Evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 135-146.
Cameron, G., Proudman, J. and Redding S. 2005. Technological Convergence, R&D, Trade 
and Productivity Growth. European Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 775 – 807.
Carree, M.A., Klomp, L. and Thurik, A.R. 2000. Productivity Convergence in OECD 
Manufacturing Industries. Economics Letters, No. 66, pp. 337–345.
Castellacci, F., Los, B. and de Vries, G.J. 2008. Sectoral Productivity Trends: Convergence 
Islands in Oceans of Divergence. Paper presented for the VI Globelics Conference.
Chenery, H. 1986. Growth and Transformation. In: H. Chenery, S. Robinson, M. Syrquin 
(Eds.). Industrialization and Growth. A Comparative Study, pp. 13-36. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Dollar, D. and Wolff E.N. 1988. Convergence of Industry Labor Productivity Among 
Advanced Economies. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 549-558.
Esteban, J. 1999. Regional Convergence in Europe and the Industry-Mix: a Shift-Share 
Analysis. Working Paper, Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC.
European Commission, Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry 2012. Industrial 
Performance Scoreboard and Member States’ Competitiveness Performance and Policies.
EU-KLEMS Database (November 2009 Release, updated March 2011). University of 
Groningen, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, available at www.euklems.net.
Fagerberg, J. 2000. Technological Progress, Structural Change and Productivity Growth: 
a Comparative Study. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, No. 11, pp. 393–411.
Freeman, D.G. and Yerger, D.B. 2001. Interpreting Cross-Section and Time-Series Tests of 
Convergence: the Case of Labor Productivity in Manufacturing. Journal of Economics 
and Business, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 593–607.
Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
28
GRODZICKI
REB 2013 
Vol. 5, No. 2
Gugler, K. and Pfaffelmayer, M. 2004. Convergence in Structure and Productivity in 
European Manufacturing? German Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 61-79.
Haraguchi, N. and Rezonja, G. 2011. Emerging Patterns of Manufacturing Structural 
Change. UNU-WIDER Working Paper No. 2011/43.
Havlik, P., Leitner, S. and Stehrer, R. 2008. Growth Resurgence, Productivity Catching-up 
and Labour Demand in CEECs. WIIW Statistical Reports, No. 3.
Hultberg, P.T., Nadiri, M.I. and Sickles, R.C. 2004. Cross-country Catch-up in the 
Manufacturing Sector: Impacts of Heterogeneity on Convergence and Technology 
Adoption. Empirical Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 753–768.
Inklaar, R. and Timmer, M.P. 2008. GGDC Productivity Level Database: International 
Comparisons of Output, Inputs and Productivity at the Industry Level. Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre Research Memorandum, GD-104.
Inklaar, R. and Timmer, M.P. 2009. Productivity Convergence Across Industries and 
Countries: The Importance of Theory-based Measurement. Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre Research Memorandum, GD-109.
Krűger, J.J. 2010. The Sources of Aggregate Productivity Growth. U.S. Manufacturing 
Industries, 1958-1996. Arbeits- und Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen 
Fakultät der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, No. 10/2006.
Kuznets, S. 1949. National Income and Industrial Structure, Econometrica, Vol. 17, pp. 205-
241.
Kuznets, S. 1980. Driving Forces of Economic Growth: What Can We Learn from History? 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd. 116, H. 3.
Landesmann, M.A. 2003. Structural Features of Economic Integration in an Enlarged 
Europe: Patterns of Catching-up and Industrial Specialization. European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Papers, No. 181.
Lin, J.Y. 2010. New Structural Economics. A Framework for Rethinking Development. 
The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5197.
Madsen, J.B. and Timol, I. 2010. Long-Run Convergence in Manufacturing and Innovation-
Based Models. Monash University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper, No. 09/10.
Malerba, F. 2002. Sectoral Systems of Innovation and Production. Research Policy, Vol. 31, 
No. 2, pp. 247–264.
McMillan, M.S. and Rodrik, D. 2011. Globalization, Structural Change and Productivity 
Growth. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17143.
Naude, W. and Szirmai, A. 2012. The Importance of Manufacturing in Economic 
Development: Past, Present and Future Perspectives. UNU-MERIT Working Papers, 
No. 2012-041.
Nelson, R.R., and Winter, S.G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Papalia, R.S. and Bertarelli, S. 2009. Decomposing Productivity Patterns in a Conditional 
Convergence Framework. Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 57-75.
Parteka, A. 2009. Economic Growth, Structural Change and Quality Upgrading in New 
Member States. Università degli Studi di Milano Working Paper, No. 2009-27.
Pascual, A.G. and Westerman, F. 2002. Productivity Convergence in European 
Manufacturing. Review of International Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 313-323.
Peneder, M. 2003. Industrial Structure and Aggregate Growth. Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 427-448.
GRODZICKI
29
REB 2013
Vol. 5, No. 2
Peneder, M. 2007. A Sectoral Taxonomy of Educational Intensity. Empirica, Vol. 34, No. 3, 
pp. 189–212.
Perez, C. 1983. Structural Change and Assimilation of New Technologies in the Economic 
and Social Systems. Futures, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 357-375.
Quah, D. 1993. Galton’s Fallacy and Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 4, pp. 427–43.
Rodrik, D. 2013. Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing. http://www.hks.harvard.
edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/Unconditional%20convergence%20rev%205.pdf .
Schumpeter, J. 1911 [1960]. Theory of Economic Development. [Teoria rozwoju gospodarcze-
go]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. 
Silva, E.G. and Teixeira, A.A.C. 2008. Surveying Structural Change: Seminal Contributions 
and a Bibliometric Account. Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 273-300.
Silva, E.G. and Teixeira, A.A.C. 2011. Does Structure Influence Growth? A Panel Data 
Econometric Assessment of “Relatively Less Developed” Countries, 1979–2003. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 457–510.
Soete, L. and Verspagen, B. 1993. Technology and Growth: The Complex Dynamic of 
Catching Up, Falling Behind and Taking Over. In: A. Szirmai, B. van Ark, D. Pilat (Eds.). 
Explaining Economic Growth, pp. 101-127. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland. 
Stephan, J. 2003. Evolving Structural Patterns in the Enlarging European Division of Labour: 
Sectoral and Branch Specialisation and the Potentials for Closing the Productivity Gap. 
IWH Sonderheft, No. 5/2003, Halle.
Syrquin, M. 1986. Productivity Growth and Factor Reallocation. In: H. Chenery, S. 
Robinson, M. Syrquin (Eds.). Industrialization and Growth. A Comparative Study, pp. 
229-262. New York: Oxford University Press.
Szirmai, A. 2011. Manufacturing and Economic Development. UNU-Wider Working Paper, 
No. 2011/75.
Temple, J. 1999. The New Growth Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), p. 112–156.
Timmer, M.P. and Szirmai, A. 2000. Productivity Growth in Asian Manufacturing: The 
Structural Bonus Hypothesis Examined. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 
Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 371-392.
Tyrväinen, T. 1998. What Do We Know about Productivity Gaps and Convergence in EMU 
Economies? Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 31/98.
Van Biesebroeck, J. 2009. Disaggregate Productivity Comparisons: Sectoral Convergence 
in OECD Countries. Journal of Productivity Analysis, No. 32, Vol. 2, pp. 63–79.
Verspagen, B. 2001. Economic Growth and Technological Change: An Evolutionary 
Interpretation. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2001/01, OECD 
Publishing.
GRODZICKI
REB 2013 
Vol. 5, No. 2
Appendix 
Table 1. Classification of Manufacturing Industries under Analysis
Industry ISIC-code
Educational intensity 
(Peneder, 2007)
Technology level
(Eurostat)
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15-16 Low Low
Textiles, Textile, Leather and Footwear 17-19 Very low Low
Wood and of Wood and Cork 20 Very low Low
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21-22 Intermediate Low
Chemical, Rubber, Plastics and Fuel 23-25 Med-low/Med-high Mixed
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 Low Medium-low
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27-28 Low Medium-low
Machinery, Nec 29 Intermediate Medium-high
Electrical and Optical Equipment 30-33 Intermediate/high Medium high/High
Transport Equipment 34-35 Intermediate/med-high Mixed
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 36-37 Med-low Low
Note:  N.e.c. stands for “Nowhere else classified”.
Source: Author’s preparation, on the basis of Peneder (2007) and Eurostat information.
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